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Abstract 
 
People administer sanctions to enhance cooperative behavior and there is evidence for the 
effectiveness of administering sanctions. The current study is a common resource 
dilemma in which we wanted to find out whether participants perceived (il)legitimacy 
influences their sanctioning behavior. Previous research indicates that legitimacy 
influences people’s behaviour, therefore we performed a legitimacy manipulation in the 
current study by giving participants fake feedback about their obtained leadership 
position. After that,they had the opportunity to costly increment (reward) or costly 
decrement (punishment) coins of other participants. We demonstrate that legitimacy has 
an effect on the sanction size of participants. Illegitimacy increases the rewards 
participants give, but there is no difference found between the illegitimate and legitimate 
condition when it comes to punishing. 
Does perceived (il)legitimacy have an influence on people’s willingness to sanction? 
In everyday life we come across a lot of different situations in which we have to 
deal with some sort of authority. We have to listen to people with authority even if we 
might think they are wrong. In some situations we might even think; ’What has he or she 
done to deserve this position?’ But what if you were the authority figure? Would you 
behave the same way if you would think your authority position is perceived as 
legitimate, compared to when you think your position is illegitimate? As an authority 
figure you very often have power over resources (van der Toorn et al., 2015), through this 
power you are in the position to sanction others. Sanctions are a much used source to 
improve the welfare of the group, but for individuals they can either be advantageous or 
disadvantageous. Sanctions can be used to influence people’s behaviour, therefore it is 
important that the people implying these sanctions do this, because they want to benefit 
the collective and not because they like the sense of power that comes along with it. It 
might be that perceiving your authority position as legitimate or illegitimate influences 
your behaviour. In other words, if a decision has to be made, whether to sanction or not, 
do people with perceived legitimate authority act the same as people with perceived 
illegitimate authority? In this research we would like to find out whether a difference can 
be found in the sanctioning style of people with legitimate authority and illegitimate 
authority. We would like to look at two factors, whether people are willing to costly 
reward or to costly punish, just like in the research of Molenmaker, de Kwaadsteniet and 
van Dijk (2014) and if the manipulation of legitimacy has an influence on the willingness 
to costly sanction and the size of these sanctions.  
 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy functions as an important foundation for social power (French and 
Raven, 1959; as mentioned in Haines & Jost, 2000). Legitimacy is ‘the belief that 
authorities, institutions and social arrangements are appropriate, proper and just’ (p. 376, 
Tyler, 2006).  A position is perceived as legitimate when the person making the decision 
is perceived as accurate and acts for the common good (Tyler, 2006). A position is 
perceived as illegitimate when the person making the decision is not justified in terms of 
rules or expertise (Tyler, 2006). The belief of legitimacy make people obey rules set by 
those who have legitimate authority (Tyler, 2006). Perceived legitimacy increases 
perceived referent, reward, coercive and expert power (Carson et al., 1993; as mentioned 
in Haines & Jost, 2000). People who have authority are usually seen by others as 
legitimate, why else would this person have the authority postition? And because being 
seen as legitimate gives people a certain power it is important to see whether the person 
having this power acts in a proper and just way, even if he or she might not perceive their 
power position as legitimate. In line with this reasoning we would like to find out 
whether the person who is in the authority position has this own sense of legitimacy and 
if this influences the sanctioning behaviour of this person.  
Power 
To find out whether having legitimate power or authority has an effect on 
people’s sanctioning behaviour, we first have to define what power is. Power is the 
control one has, in comparison to other people, over desired resources (Fiske & Berdahl, 
2007; van der Toorn et al., 2015). Having power would normally make people act in a 
way which makes them keep this power (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003, Kipnis, 
1976, as mentioned in Van der Toorn et al., 2015). When trying to keep power people 
might overstep some boundaries, because they feel that they are no longer restricted to 
social norms and that they can behave the way they want to behave (Keltner et al., 2003; 
as mentioned in van der Toorn et al., 2015). 
Power gives access to rewards and punishments (Magee, Galinsky & Gruenfeld, 
2007, as mentioned in van der Toorn et al., 2015). These sanctions are used to increase 
cooperation (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965, as mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2014), but 
they can also be used to enhance the position of the powerholder (Yamagishi, 1986, 
1988; as mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2014).  In the current research the 
powerholders will have the opportunity to sanction (punish or reward) ‘other’ 
participants. Perceived legitimacy can give powerholders the sense that they are entitled 
to make decisions over others (French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1993, as mentioned in 
Haines & Jost, 2000). Proof has been found that people experiencing legitimate authority 
are more likely to challenge norms, because when norms are not in their advantage they 
will not follow them (Levine, 1989 as noted in Hayes & Goldstein, 2015). However, the 
question remained unanswered is if this is the same for powerholders who perceive that 
their power is illegitimate?  
To approach or to inhibit? 
People come across a lot of situations in which they have to decide whether they 
want to take action (approach) or do nothing (inhibit). For example, when disagreeing 
with your boss, do you say that you do not agree with him or her, with the risk of getting 
into an argument, or will you avoid this risk by not taking any action? Janoff-Bulman, 
Sheikh and Hepp (2009; as mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2014) say that  morality 
influences the decision making process. Prescriptive morality is activation based and is 
about doing what is right. Proscriptive morality is inhibition based and tells us sometimes 
it is better to do nothing, these are the things we should not do. In this theory the 
activation-based system is about doing what is good for other people and the inhibition-
based system is about not doing harm to others.  
When people have power they approach more and take more risks  (Anderson & 
Berdahl, 2002; Smith & Bargh, in press; as mentioned in Lammers et al., 2008). The so 
called Behavioural Approach System gets activated (BAS; Keltner, Grunefeld & 
Anderson, 2003 as mentioned in Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn & Otten, 2008). If BAS 
gets activated, chances are that people act according to prescriptive morality, this is in 
line with the reasoning of Janoff-Bulman, Shekh and Hepp (2009; as mentioned in 
Molendmaker et al., 2014). Sanctions are mostly implemented to benefit the collective 
welfare. That’s why we expect that an activation of BAS will lead to more sanctioning 
behaviour, because sanctioning is actively implementing something. 
But does BAS always gets activated when someone experiences power? Lammers 
and colleagues (2008) found that BAS indeed gets activated when people perceive their 
authority to be legitimate. People experiencing legitimate power might thus sanction to 
benefit the group outcomes. Lammers and colleagues (2008) also mention some 
situations in which people had power but did not take any action, which would not make 
any sense according earlier research of Anderson and Berdahl (2002); Smith and Bargh, 
(2008) both mentioned in Lammers and colleagues (2008), because power makes people 
approach. That is why Lammers and colleagues (2008) researched if legitimacy had an 
influence on people’s behaviour. They found that illegitimate power did not activate 
BAS, but the behavioural inhibition system (BIS; Carver and White, 1994). If different 
systems get activated because of perceived (il)legitimacy we would expect that there will 
be found a difference in sanctioning behaviour between participants in the legitimate 
condition and participants in the illegitimate condition. We would expect that perceived 
legitimacy would lead to the activation of BAS which would lead to more sanctioning 
behaviour and because illegitimacy according to Lammers and colleagues (2008) leads to 
BIS we would expect that people in the illegitimate condition sanction less. We also 
expect people in the legitimate condition to sanction more than people in the illegitimate 
condition based on another statement of Lammers and colleagues (2008). They propose 
that people in the illegitimate condition might take less action because they might not feel 
that they are entitled to take any action, action taking might risk their position and this is 
what they would like to prevent from happening.  
Willingness to punish or reward 
According to the research of Molenmaker, de Kwaadsteniet and Van Dijk (2014), 
people are more willing to reward cooperation than to punish non-cooperation. In their 
research when people had to make a decision whether they were going to punish or do 
nothing, they were more likely to do nothing. Secondly when having the choice between 
rewarding or punishing participants, people choose rewarding a lot more than punishing. 
This reluctance to punish could be caused by the do-no-harm principle (Molenmaker et 
al., 2014). This principle tells that even though the overall wins are higher than the losses 
imposed by punishment, people are still reticent to cause other people harm (Baron, 1993, 
1995; Baron & Jurney, 1993; Baron & Ritov, 94; Spranca, Minsk & Baron, 1991; as 
mentioned in Molenmaker et al, 2014).  Molenmaker and colleagues (2016) argue that 
this reluctance to punish might not be because people do not want to inflict harm to 
others, but because people do not want to be responsible for the harm done. In this case 
people might not punish as much as they would like to, because they might have to 
justify why they inflict this harm (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Schlenker et al, 1994 as 
mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2016).  Based on to these studies there is a large 
possibility that in the current research differences will be found between the sanctioning 
conditions. It is likely that overall people will reward more than they will punish. In the 
current study we expect that even though there is an overall reluctance to punish, people 
in the legitimate authority condition will punish more than people in the illegitimate 
authority condition.  We would expect this because according to Semin & Manstead 
(1983; as mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2016 ) people’s willingness to punish gets 
hold back by their expectancy that they have to justify their actions. People in the 
illegitimate authority condition might experience a greater fear for having to justify their 
decisions and would therefore punish less than people in the legitimate authority 
condition do. Secondly we would not expect to see a difference between legitimate and 
illegitimate in de reward condition, because overall people prefer to rewards over 
punishments (Molenmaker et al., 2014) and therefore we expect that legitimacy will have 
no influence on this factor. 
Social dilemma’s: The common resource dilemma 
A social dilemma is a situation in which people have to choose between what is 
good for their own interest and what is good for the collective interest (de Kwaadsteniet, 
van Dijk, Wit, de Cremer, de Rooij, 2007). In the current research we will make use of a 
common resource dilemma. In this kind of dilemma there is a collective ownership over 
the resources, people get to make the choice whether to utilize from the common resource 
or not (Molenmaker et al.,2014). The resources in the common resource dilemma are 
believed to be collective (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1997; as mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 
2014). Another much used social dilemma is a public good dilemma, in which people 
own resources themselves and they can make a decision to contribute these resources for 
the public good (Molemaker et al., 2014). But, because a common resource dilemma is 
about the collective, people think it is more wrong to take something from this collective 
pool than when the pool is more seen as private (like in the public good dilemma) and are 
therefore more willing to punish people in this kind of dilemma (Molenmaker et al., 
2014). This is why we will make use of the common resource dilemma in this research. 
According to these studies we would expect that there will be a difference in the 
way people with legitimate and illegitimate authority sanction. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: Participants will sanction more in the reward condition than in the 
punishment condition. Secondly we would expect that participants in the legitimate 
condition will sanction more than participants in the illegitimate condition. The third 
hypothesis is: Participants in the legitimate authority condition will give higher sanctions 
in the punishment condition than people in the illegitimate authority condition do, but 
legitimacy will have no effect in the reward condition.  
 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 165 students at Leiden University ( 117 women, 
M= 20,91 years old and 48 men, M=20,52 age old ).  
 
Design. The design is a 2 (Authority type: legitimate authority versus illegitimate 
authority) x 2(  Sanction type: Reward versus Punishment) design.  
 
Procedure. The participants were recruited at Leiden University. They were 
asked to participate in leadership task in the laboratory. First the participant had to sign 
the informed consent. After they did this participants were set in separate cabins each 
provided with a computer. In this study there were four conditions, the legitimate/ reward 
condition, the illegitimate reward condition, the legitimate punishment condition and the 
illegitimate reward condition. The computer randomly assigned the participant to one of 
these four conditions. The layout of this study is inspired by the study of Molenmaker 
and colleagues (2014).  
After some short instructions, which explained that they had to work to getter 
with other participants, the participants started with a bogus leadership task. After this 
task they were told what their role would be in the next part of the study. They were 
instructed that the leadership role they got assigned was either random, but that other 
participants scored better on the leadership task, or because they had scored best on the 
bogus leadership task. This was the legitimacy manipulation. 
All participants were appointed as the leader. They were instructed that the leader 
had to make a choice to increment coins (reward condition) or to decrement coins 
(punishment condition) or do nothing. The leadership role gave them the final say about 
how at the end, the earned money was divided.  
The participants were told that the other participants (these were fake) could 
maximally gather 100 coins, each from the joint resources of 200 coins. All coins were 
worth €0,10. The coins gathered by each participant was for their private gains, the coins 
left would be multiplied by 1,5 and get divided over the two participants (Molenmaker et 
al., 2014). To make sure that the participants understood what was told, we asked them 
questions after the explanation and after that we gave them the correct answers to 
questions.  After these questions, the task started.  
Participants had to wait until the ‘other’ participants were finished, this took about 
two minutes and then they saw the decisions the ‘other’ participants had made. The 
feedback showed that there was one participant who took 20 coins from the shared pool 
and there was one participant who took 80 coins from the shared pool (Molenmaker et 
al., 2014). After this the participants were given a choice to either take coins from one of 
the two other participants (punishment condition), or to give coins to one of the two other 
participants (reward condition).  When they decided to reward or to punish (we never 
mentioned the word punishment or reward) they made a choice how many decrement or 
increment coins they were going to use, the range from these coins was from 0 to 200 
(Molenmaker et al., 2014). The participants were told, that the choices they made 
determined how much extra money they would receive.  
At the end the participants got a small questionnaire about whether they felt that 
they had ‘earned their position’ and if they were ‘the best candidate to make the 
decision’. After this the participants got debriefed and got their monetary reward or 
creditpoint (Molenmaker et al., 2014). 
 
Results 
Comprehension checks 
To check the comprehension of type of sanction we asked the participants four 
control questions. Question 1 ‘Is taking coins from the common pool good for the group 
outcomes or for the outcomes from the individual taking the coins?’ was answered 
correctly by 97,0% of the participants, question 2 ‘What happens with the coins that 
remain in the common pool?’ was answered correctly by 98,8% of the participants, 
question 3 ‘How many coins do you as a leader have to turn in to imply a penalty or a 
bonus of three coins?’ was answered correctly by 92,1 % of the participants and question 
4 ‘How many coins did you as the leader have in your personal account to imply a 
sanction?’ was answered correctly by 97,6% of the participants. This indicates that 
participants had a good understanding of the sanctioning choices. 
 We have checked whether participants understood why they were given the 
leadership position.  They had to answer two questions. The two questions asked were: 
‘Did you score above average on the leadership task or did you score below average on 
the leadership task?’ (93,9% answered correctly) and ‘Were you assigned the leadership 
position randomly or did you become the leader because scored above average?’ (89,1% 
answered correctly).  This indicated that participants had an understanding of why they 
were assigned the leadership position, which was part of the legitimacy manipulation. 
Manipulation checks 
To check whether our manipulation of legitimacy was successful, participants had 
to judge five statements on a 1-7 Likert scale, in which 1 was to a small extent and 7 was 
to a large extent. We have tested if there was a difference in answers between participants 
in the legitimate and in the illegitimate condition. We executed an independent samples t-
test, the grouping variable hereby was legitimacy and the independent variables were the 
five statements. In Table 1. the means and standard deviations of these statements are 
displayed, in Table 2. the results of the t-tests are displayed. 
 Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations Legitimacy Statements. 
Statement Legitimacy Mean SD 
‘I was the leader, because I 
deserved it.’ 
Legitimate 3,07 1,47 
 Illegitimate 2,37 1,50 
‘I was the right person for the 
leadership role’. 
Legitimate 4,13 1,48 
 
 Illegitimate 4,30 1,62 
‘I was appointed the leader 
because of an honest procedure’. 
Legitimate 4,33 1,70 
 Illegitimate 3,67 2,06 
‘I had the right to sanction’. Legitimate 5,21 1,50 
 Illegitimate 5,50 1,47 
‘I think I deserved to be the 
leader’. 
Legitimate 3,22 1.59 
 Illegitimate 3,00 1,71 
 
Table 2. Independent Samples T-Test Legitimacy Statements. 
 t Df Sign.  
Statement    
‘I was the leader, because I 
deserved it.’ 
-3,05 163 ,003** 
‘I was the right person for the 
leadership role’. 
,72 163 ,476 
‘I was appointed the leader 
because of an honest 
procedure’. 
-2,27 163 ,024* 
‘I had the right to sanction’. 1,22 163 ,223 
‘I think I deserved to be the 
leader’. 
-,84 163 ,400 
*=  p <.05. **= p<.01 
These results indicate that people in the illegitimate condition were aware of the fact that 
they deserved their role less than people in the legitimate condition. Secondly, people in 
the illegitimate condition found the selection procedure less fair than people in the 
legitimate condition. The three statements that were not found significant indicate that 
although people were aware of the fact that they had deserved or had not deserved the 
leadership role, they did not feel like they were more or less deserving or that they were 
the right person for the job. Secondly they did not differ in their feelings whether they 
had the right to sanction or not. This indicates that the legitimacy manipulation was partly 
successful.  
Testing the hypotheses 
Next we tested the first hypothesis: ‘Participants are more likely to imply rewards 
than to imply punishments’ and the second hypothesis: ‘Participants with legitimate 
authority are more likely to sanction than participants with illegitimate authority’. To test 
whether participants were more likely to reward than punish and to test whether people 
with legitimate authority sanctioned more that people with illegitimate authority, we 
performed a binary logistic regression in which Sanction Dichotomous was the dependent 
variable and where Sanction Type (punish or reward) and Legitimacy (Legitimate or 
illegitimate) were the independent variables. The binary logistic regression indicated that 
there was no significant main effect for both sanction type (B= .69, SE=.43, Wald 
(df=1)=2.57, p=.109) and legitimacy (B=.33, SE=.43, Wald (df=1)=.62, p=.430) This 
means that participants did not significantly reward more than they punished and that 
participants  in the legitimate authority condition did not apply more sanctions than 
participants in the illegitimate condition. The first two hypotheses can therefore be 
rejected. 
 The third hypothesis we tested was: ‘People in the illegitimate condition punish 
less than people in de legitimate condition, but legitimacy will have no effect in the 
reward condition’. To test this hypothesis we performed a two-way ANOVA, in which 
sanction size was the dependent variable and sanction type and legitimacy were the 
independent variables. We found a marginally significant main effect for sanction type 
F(1,161)= 3.83, p=.052. The main effect of legitimacy also yielded a marginally 
significant effect F(1,161)=3.45, p=.065. There was also a marginally significant 
interaction effect for Sanction Type and Legitimacy F(1,161)=2.886, p=.091. Based on 
the marginal means sanctions in the reward condition (M=6.34) were higher than in the 
punishment condition (M=4.89). The estimated marginal means of legitimacy indicated 
that the participants in the illegitimate condition gave higher sanctions (M=6.30, 
SD=5.08), than participants in de legitimate condition (M=4.93, SD=4.56). The estimated 
marginal means indicated, that the outcomes where not in line with our hypothesis. In the 
reward condition it were the participants in the illegitimate condition who gave higher 
sanctions (M=7.66, SD=5.30), than the participants in the legitimate condition (M=5.02, 
SD=4.86). In the punishment condition the differences between participants in the 
illegitimate condition (M= 4.95, SD=4,51) and in the legitimate condition (M=4.83, 
SD=4,30) were very small, these results are demonstrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Interaction Legitimacy and Sanction Type 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Legitimacy functions as an important foundation for social power (French and 
Raven, 1959; as mentioned in Haines & Jost, 2000). People who are seen as legitimate 
are expected to act in a just and fair manner (Tyler, 2006) and therefore do what is right 
for the collective welfare. Sanctions are mostly used to make individuals act in a 
cooperative manner and by that improve the group outcomes (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965, 
both mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2014). In line with this reasoning we expected that 
people who experience legitimate authority would sanction in order to improve what is 
good for the collective. 
The study of Lammers and colleagues (2007) described that there is difference 
between the behaviour of leaders with legitimate power and illegitimate power. They 
proposed that it was because of illegitimacy that some power holders were not willing to 
take action. People experiencing illegitimate authority might fear that they would lose 
their position if they take action. This might have something to do with the fear of having 
to take responsibility for their actions. Early studies show that people are reluctant to 
punish others because they do not like doing harm to others (Baron, 1993; Baron & 
Jurney, 1993; both mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2014). The study of Molenmaker and 
colleagues (2016) explained that it might not be that people don’t want to do others harm, 
but that people are afraid to take responsibility for the harm done. Based on these studies 
we wanted to find out whether perceived (il)legitimacy would also have an influence on 
the sanctioning behaviour of power holders. We proposed three hypotheses and we found 
some interesting material for further research.  
In line with the study of Molenmaker and colleagues (2014), we expected that 
people were more willing to sanction, when they could reward other participants then 
when they could punish other participants. In the current study, we did not find evidence 
for this effect, there was no difference found between the reward and the punishment 
condition in the frequency of administering sanctions.  
 People with legitimate power approach more (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Smith 
& Bargh, in press; as mentioned in Lammers et al., 2008) and take more risks than people 
without power (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Maner Gaillot, Butz & Peruche, 2007, both 
mentioned in Lammers et al., 2008). Lammers and colleagues (2008) also explained that 
the sense of illegitimacy might activate inhibition of action, therefore we expected that 
participants in the legitimate condition would sanction more than participants in the 
illegitimate condition. In the current study we found no prove for this expectation. People 
in the legitimacy condition did not administer more sanctions than people in de 
illegitimacy condition. As we will explain further we have found the opposite effect of 
what we expected.  
 In our third hypothesis we stated that participants in the legitimate condition 
administer higher punishments than participants in the illegitimate condition and that in 
the reward condition we would not find any differences between the two legitimacy 
conditions.  We found an (marginally significant) interaction effect between legitimacy 
and sanction type on sanction size, but it was not the effect that we expected. What we 
found was that there were no differences between the legitimacy conditions in the 
punishment condition, but that illegitimacy made participants administer higher rewards 
than participants in the legitimacy condition. Earlier research stated that illegitimacy 
activates inhibition (Lammers et al., 2008), though after the results of this research we 
might think that this is  not necessarily true. Inhibition may occur when the action that 
has to be taken could have a negative influence on the position of the leader, but it might 
be opposite for positive sanctions. Earlier research found that people who administer 
punishments are at risk of getting punished back, because the persons who got punished 
are willing to take revenge (Molenmaker et al., 2016). In the reward condition this might 
be the opposite, because when you administer a reward the only risk you get is getting 
rewarded back (Molenmaker at al., 2016) which is not a negative thing. People in the 
illegitimacy condition therefore could be overcompensating for their illegitimate position 
by giving away high rewards, with the only risk of getting rewarded for it by the other 
participants. In line with Molenmaker and colleagues (2016) fear of revenge might be one 
of the reason people do not punish as much as they reward. 
Future research should try to find out more about why people in the illegitimacy 
condition sanctioned more in the reward condition. A possible thing to look at might be 
fear of retaliation and for the reward condition positive reciprocity. Molenmaker and 
colleagues (2016) already did some research on jointly versus individually sanctioning, it 
might be interesting to see whether legitimacy has an influence on the decision making 
process of a group. When a group has illegitimate power is there also a willingness to 
reward to a greater extent than to punish?  
Out of curiosity, we looked at the gender differences in this study. There were too 
few male participants to draw conclusions out of these results, but they indicate a 
difference in sanctioning style between male and female participants. This could be 
something to look into for future research as well.  
Finally, the results we found in the current study were found within a social 
dilemma, not cooperating in a social dilemma has consequences for the group (de 
Kwaadsteniet et al., 2007). We have used a common resource dilemma, this because 
within a common resource dilemma the resources are believed to be collective (Van Dijk 
& Wilke, 1997; as mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2014). Molenmaker and colleagues 
(2014) already described their was a difference between the sanctioning behaviour within 
a common resource dilemma en within a public good dilemma. It might be interesting to 
research if legitimacy also has an influence on the sanctioning behaviour within a public 
good dilemma. That would be an extension of this research and would make the results 
more generalizable for real life. 
 
Implications and limitations 
The current research provides evidence that legitimacy has an influence on 
people’s sanctioning behaviour. Although the results have to be further explored in future 
research, these results could be interesting for every situation in which sanctions can be 
used. For instance companies and governments should take into account that people who 
are seen as the authority figure do not always perceive their own position as legitimate. 
These people might use rewards to keep their social position or they might want to use 
rewards to climb the social ladder. Even though it is a bit early to draw such dramatic 
statements, the perceived illegitimacy of authority figures might contribute to 
governmental problems such as corruption. Overall the main purpose of sanctions is 
enhancing the collective welfare (Molenmaker et al., 2014), excessive rewarding may 
cost a company more than necessary which is not beneficial for the group. This is one 
more reason why further research on this topic is necessary. 
We did not find evidence that people administer more rewards than punishments. 
This could be caused by the layout of the current study. Participants only had the option 
to either punish of do nothing or reward or do nothing. If you only have the option to 
sanction or not to sanction you might be more inclined to administer the sanction, even if 
it is punishing. Therefore, participants in the punishment condition might have 
administered these punishments, because they felt that they had to do so, because the 
other option was doing nothing. According to Molenmaker and colleagues (2014) when 
participants get the opportunity to either choose between punishing non-co-operators of 
rewarding co-operators they were more likely to reward. That is why in future research 
we could give participants the opportunity to reward, punish or do nothing. If participants 
are given this choice we could really compare the sanctioning choices. 
We have to be careful with generalizing the results of this sudy, because 
participants were all students at Leiden University. To see whether these results are the 
same for the population we should draw a more mixed sample, considering age, 
education and gender.  
Three out of five manipulation checks were not successful; this might indicate that 
the differences between the legitimacy and illegitimacy group were too small and that 
therefore the difference in choosing to sanction was not found. Future research should try 
to extent the differences between the legitimacy condition and the illegitimacy condition 
to check whether there is really no difference in their choice to apply sanctions.  
Since our manipulation of legitimacy was only partly successful, we have to be 
cautious with drawing conclusions out of the results of this study. Though it is 
remarkable that even though the manipulation was only party successful we have found a 
(marginally) difference between the legitimate and the illegitimate condition. This 
emphasizes the importance for future research to intensify the legitimacy manipulation, to 
further investigate the influence of legitimacy.  
 
Conclusions 
The current research has provided some insights in people’s sanctioning behaviour. It 
tells us that legitimacy might influence the size in which these sanctions are 
implemented. These results are important to look into, because it might have a lot of 
consequences for organizations and governments, because it tells us that even though you 
are the powerholder this does not mean that you will always do what for the collective.  
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